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ABSTRACT 
The attractiveness of an employer became more important for employees 
over time. It influences the decision to reject a job or to stay in the job. Incentives 
are useful to motivate employees to do their job and to stay with their employer.  
The U.S. Navy uses many different incentives to motivate sailors to stay in the 
Navy.  
The Navy spends the biggest amount of money to motivate enlisted 
sailors to stay in the Navy for the reenlistment bonuses. The budget for this 
reenlistment bonus increased over time, but it is still difficulty to meet the end-
strength goals.  The use of Non-Monetary Incentives (NMIs) becomes more 
interesting to stop the increasing in budget of reenlistment bonuses. 
The use of NMIs only makes sense if the sailor values these incentives 
higher than it costs the Navy. Therefore, the Navy has to know how much an NMI 
cost. 
To identify the cost of NMIs that are related to the assignment process, 
this research uses a simulation model. The simulation model simulates the 
assignment process and is used to identify differences in assignment-related 
costs. In different scenarios, the single and combined use of NMIs was tested. 
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On December 31, 2009, 329,518 sailors were serving in the U.S. Navy. Of 
this number, 273,448 sailors were enlisted. With this number of employees, the 
Navy is a big competitor on the labor market. To gain and to hold sailors, the 
Navy invests a lot on sailor recruiting and reenlistment. In the fiscal year (FY) 
2009, the Navy spent $333 million on reenlistment bonuses (Department of the 
Navy, Fiscal year 2011, Budgets Estimates, 2010). In FY 1999, it spent $169 
million. (Department of the Navy, Fiscal Year 2001, Budgets Estimates, 2000) 
Within ten years, the budget for reenlistment bonuses has almost doubled. In 
times of economic crises, further increases in budgets will be very limited.  
 Avoiding the excessive costs of bonuses while still meeting retention goals 
is a current focus area for the Navy. Non-monetary incentives can help to 
increase motivation and a sailor's willingness to stay in the Navy. A survey has 
shown that non-monetary incentives, such as homeport of choice, billet of choice 
or regional stability, as alternatives to or in combination with a bonus check might 
have a higher value to the sailor than they directly cost the U.S. Navy. 
The mechanism used to offer the non-monetary incentives (NMIs) is the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) (Zimmermann, December 
2008). CRAM minimizes cost for the Navy in the reenlistment process. In this 
process, reenlistment bonuses, sailors' values for NMIs and cost for NMIs are 
included. The CRAM will be explained in more detail in Chapter II. For the right 
use of this mechanism, it is necessary to know the cost of the non-monetary 
incentives offered. This thesis evaluates the cost of non-monetary incentives that 
can be used in the CRAM and that have an impact on the assignment process. 
B. GOALS 
The primary goals of this thesis are to assess the cost incurred by the U.S. 
Navy in offering an NMI. Additionally the thesis evaluates the constraints placed 
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on the detailer offering NMIs. The cost and detailer constraints are estimated by 
simulating the assignment process of E4 to E6 sailors. 
C.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope will include: (1) a review of current non-monetary incentives, 
(2) a description of the assignment process, (3) the creation of a simulation 
model that mimics the assignment process over time, and (4) a calculation of the 
cost of the assignment process with and without non-monetary incentives.  
This thesis is limited to measurable effects of NMIs that are related to the 
assignment process. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on an enlisted 
environment. Individual sailor’s values of NMIs and benefits such as increased 
motivation are not included in the simulation model. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Costs are analyzed by simulating the detailing process. The simulation 
model will include a community of sailors and their assignments over a period of 
time. All necessary information about the sailors will be discussed. The 
simulation will consider promotion, attrition rates, retention rates and sea-shore 
rotation. The model will estimate assignment costs over time. This cost includes 
moving costs as well as pay grade mismatch cost. Both costs will be explained in 
Chapter II. 
The calculated assignment costs will be compared before and after adding 
the possibility to use non-monetary incentives into the model. The results should 
indicate the effect of non-monetary incentives on the assignment process and 
whether they have a significant impact or not.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The next chapter provides the reader with background information on non-
monetary incentives. The chapter also introduces the ideas behind the CRAM 
and describes the detailing process.  
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In the third chapter, the simulation model is described. This chapter should 
give the reader a detailed impression how the results in Chapter IV are 
generated. Chapter V answers the research questions, summarizes the research 
and makes recommendations. 
Finally, the appendix shows detailed summary statistics and a short 
















The main goal of this thesis is to identify the cost of Non-Monetary-
Incentives (NMIs) that are related to the assignment process. Before focusing on 
the specific set of NMIs that are the focus of this research, incentives in general 
will be explained.  
Incentives should motivate people to do something. Incentives are an 
instrument to create a motivational environment for employees. The next 
paragraph presents a motivation theory before specific incentives are introduced 
later. 
1. The Two-Factor Theory 
Answering the question what motivates employees to work or even stay 
with their employer is as complex as the human being itself. To understand how 
incentives work, the motivation theory of Frederick Herzberg is explained next. In 
1959, Frederick Herzberg, an American psychologist, published his two-factor 
theory, also known as Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory. 
(Exams_tutor_business) Herzberg categorized work related factors into two 
parts.  The first category is the hygiene factors. These factors do not motivate 
employees, but if they are missing, the absence of these factors could reduce 
motivation. The second category is the motivators. If these factors exist 
employees are motivated to do their job, they are satisfied. If not, employees are 
not only not satisfied, but not unmotivated. The following table shows the two 






Hygiene Factors Motivators 
Salary Nature of Work 
Job Security Sense of Achievement 
Working Conditions Recognition 
Level and Quality of 
Supervision 
Responsibility 
Company Policy and 
Administration 





Table 1.    Herzbergs Two-factor Theory (Exams_tutor_business) 
The hygiene factors are seen as extrinsic factors and they represent the 
complete job environment. The motivators are intrinsic factors; factors related to 
the job content. According to Herzberg, both factors are equally important. If an 
incentive should encourage somebody to do something, the incentive is a 
motivator. Money is generally seen by Herzberg as a force that makes somebody 
to do something, it is not a motivator to do something well.    
2. Incentives 
Monetary incentives are problematic. Offering a bonus for the employee of 
the month can motivate employees to do their work well to earn this bonus; on 
the other hand, this bonus could transform co-workers to competitors, which can 
disturb the interpersonal relationship. This can reduce one hygiene factor, which 
would lead to dissatisfaction and lack of motivation (Kohn, 1993). A possible 
monetary incentive could be stock options. This kind of incentive can motivate all 
employees to do well.  
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3. Non-Monetary-Incentives 
NMIs can have advantages for both employees and employers. Increasing 
employee motivation might increase the benefits for the employer. If the increase 
in benefits is bigger than the costs of NMIs given to the employees, this will be a 
win-win situation.  
Examples of NMIs are retirement planning, job training, sabbaticals, 
professional development, feedback and flexible work schedules. A survey by the 
American Association of Retired Persons has shown that different generations 
desire slightly different NMIs. “Baby Boomers” (born between 1946 and 1964) 
have job training on the list of desired NMIs, while Generation X’ers (born 
between 1964 and 1981) do not. Instead, this generation desires professional 
development, which was not a priority in the former time (Nelson, 1999). Offering 
incentives became more important for an organization over time to be 
competitive on the labor market. 
4. NMIs in the Navy 
The U.S. Navy, as every other military branch, is a big competitor on the 
labor market. To be attractive, the Navy offers their sailors many NMIs. This 
section only will provide the reader with a small overview of exemplary NMIs that 
the Navy offers. The Navy presents itself as an attentive employer, provides 
sailors with free health care, and supports them with military housing and 
childcare. The Navy also uses a couple of feedback systems, such as exams and 
performance marks. Further, the Navy offers many different training and 
education programs, which help sailors develop their Navy careers or prepares 
sailors for a career in the civil labor market.  
NMIs that are related to the assignment process will be introduced later in 
this chapter. The next section focuses on reenlistment and the use of the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism. 
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B. REENLISTMENT 
The U.S. Navy recruits enlisted sailors for a first four-year period of 
obligation. During these times, the Navy looses approximately half of the enlisted 
sailors (55% of the 1994 cohort).  After this four-year obligation, the U.S. Navy 
offers reenlistment bonuses to encourage sailors to stay in the Navy. In 2009, the 
Navy spent $333 million on these reenlistment bonuses.(Department of the Navy, 
Fiscal year 2011, Budgets Estimates, 2010) As mentioned in Chapter I, this 
bonus money increased dramatically over the last several years. A further 
increase is not an attractive option at this time, which makes the Navy think 
about alternatives to motivate sailors to stay in the Navy. Increasing the 
attractiveness of the Navy in general is one option. Another option is offering 
NMIs in the reenlistment process. The last option leads to the idea of selling 
NMIs in an auction process. These NMIs, sold in combination with monetary 
bonuses, can be a combinatorial incentive package that makes sailors stay in the 
Navy. The idea behind the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 
is explained in the next section.  
C. CRAM 
Zimmermann (2008) did a survey to estimate sailor’s values for various 
NMIs. Then she combined these NMIs with reenlistment bonuses and estimated 
the Navy’s savings based on sailor values for NMIs in the reenlistment process. 
The mechanism she used is the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism. 
“Under the CRAM, a retained Sailor receives a particular NMI only if he values 
the incentive more than it cost the Navy to provide. This eliminates the need to 
determine which incentives to offer. All incentives are offered to all Sailors and 
allocated to those whose value exceeds cost.”(Zimmermann, December 2008) 
Some of the NMIs used in CRAM are related to the sailor assignment 
process. These NMIs are described in the next section. 
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D. NMIS IN THE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
This section introduces the NMIs that will be simulated in this research 
and explains the assignment process related costs. 
1. Types of NMIs  
Three different types of NMIs and possible combinations of these are 
related to the assignment process: Homeport of Choice, Platform of Choice, and 
finally Regional Stability. 
a) Homeport of Choice  
Homeport of Choice is the opportunity for a sailor to choose a 
homeport in which he would like to serve. If he chooses this opportunity as a 
reenlistment NMI, he gets the guarantee to stay the complete time of his next 
tour in this region. If the sailor needs a new billet during this tour, he will be 
assigned to a new billet at the same place. 
b) Platform of Choice 
With Platform of Choice, the sailor is guaranteed to serve on the 
type of platform he has chosen. It does not matter where the platform is located. 
If a type of platform is available in different homeports, it is up to the detailer to 
choose the sailor’s homeport. 
c) Regional Stability 
The last option is the Regional Stability. Taking this NMI allows the 
sailor to stay in a region for two tours. There is also a possibility to increase the 
number of tours, but this research concentrates on the opportunity to stay for two 
tours. 
d) Tested Types and Combinations of Nmis  
The simulation model designed to identify costs of NMIs estimated 
the costs of six different NMI choices and combinations. These types are based 
on the described NMIs above. Table 2.   provides an overview of the NMIs that 
are simulated in this research. 
 10
Tested Type NMI/NMI combination 
Type 1 Homeport of Choice  
Type 2 Platform of Choice 
Type 3 Homeport of Choice and Platform of Choice 
Type 4 Regional Stability 
Type 5 Homeport of Choice and Regional Stability 
Type 6 Homeport of Choice and Platform of Choice and 
Regional Stability 
Table 2.   Overview of NMIs used in simulation model 
2. Assignment Related Costs 
The goal of this thesis is to identify cost of NMIs that can be offered for 
reenlistment and have an impact on the assignment process. Explanations for 
the costs that are measured with the simulation model follow. 
a) PCS Costs 
The PCS cost depends on the distance the sailor has to move 
(distance between old and new billet) and the weight he is allowed to move, 
which depends on the pay grade.  
b) Mismatch Cost 
Under perfect conditions, every sailor in the Navy organization 
would have a billet that fits the sailor’s rank. If the sailor’s rank is higher or lower 
than the required rank, or if no sailor is available for a billet, there is a mismatch 
in the system. This mismatch creates an opportunity cost, which could be defined 
as a difference of the pay grade of the sailor and the pay grade that is related to 
the billet’s required rank.  
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To capture changes in these costs while offering sailors NMIs, a 
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III. SIMULATION MODEL 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
The goal of this research is to simulate the assignment process. This is 
done by describing a community of sailors over time. The process is presented in 
Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Overview on the assignment process.  
This assignment process can be seen in three parts. First, on the input 
side, there is the community of sailors and a set of billets. The second part is the 
assignment process and the third part is the output. The output of the detailer’s 
work is the sailors’ orders, the assignments. This assignments lead to moving 
sailors, which produces costs. The simulation model determines changes in 
costs while changing constraints in the assignment process. 
In the next sections of this chapter, present the inputs and the assignment 
process. The last section describes the simulation model. 
B. INPUTS 
The detailer input will be the group of sailors who need new billets. To get 
this information requires a sailor community as well as a set of billets. The 
assignment process is a monthly recurring action. Therefore, the simulation sailor 








promotion, attrition and aging. The simulation sailor community and the 
organization of billets are described in the next paragraphs.   
1. The Sailor Community 
To assign an individual sailor in the assignment process to different billets, 
requires simulating a community of sailors with individual characteristics. This 
section explains the individual characteristics as well as the sailor community’s 
behavior that are used in the simulation.  
a) Sailor Community Structure 
The Aviation Support (AS) community was chosen as the Navy 
community to model sailors. The size and structure of this community was used 
to generate the simulated sailor community.(Bureau of Navy Personnel, 2009)  
The AS community includes different Navy Enlisted Codes (NEC). Each NEC 
requires different skills. The sailor’s skills have to match the billet requirements. 
Therefore, it is very unlikely that a detailer would take a sailor of one NEC to 
assign him to a billet that requires another NEC. For this reason, the simulation 
concentrates only on a part of the whole AS community, which reduces the size 
of the simulation community. Another limitation is a focus on the ranks E4 to E6. 
With these two constraints, the simulated sailor community by rank, E4-E6, is 
depicted in Figure 2.   
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Figure 2.   Distribution of E4 to E6 over Years of Service 
Based on this sailor community structure each sailor in the 
community has his or her own characteristics. 
b) Individual Sailor Characteristics 
The individual sailor characteristics that are used in the simulation 
model are Time in Service (TIS), pay grade, Time in Rate (TIR), point of leaving 
the simulation (loss date), the next promotion date and individual NMI 
preferences. 
TIS, pay grade and TIR are related to the community structure 
shown in Figure 2.  The loss date, the promotion date and individual preferences 
are simulated using a random number generator. To generate the loss date, the 
U.S. Navy was used as a model. Because of a high attrition rate within the first 
10 years of service, and nearly no attrition between 15 and 20 years of service, 
the 1994 cohort data set was taken to capture the attrition rate of the first years 
of service. The generic empirical attrition distribution of the U.S. Navy 1994 
enlisted cohort is used in a Monte Carlo simulation to generate the loss date as 
an individual sailor characteristic in the simulation model. (See Figure 3.  ) 
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Figure 3.   Attrition distribution for Sailor finished 16 Months of Service 
The process of promotion is simplified for the simulation. Basic 
eligibilities like the required time in service (TIS) and time in rate (TIR) (Table 3.  ) 
are included in the simulation, while other factors that influence promotion in 
actuality, such as exam scores and performance points, are excluded. To 
capture all these individual qualities in the simulation, a random time is added to 
the earliest possible time for promotion. This random time is normally distributed 
and determined by the Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation model, a 
promotion will be executed after the TIS and TIR requirements are fulfilled and a 
random time has passed. 
 
Promotion to Time in Service Time in Rate 
E4 2 years 6 months 
E5 3 years 12 months 
E6 7 years 36 months 
E7 11 years 36 months 
Table 3.   Time Requirements for Promotions (Military.com, 2009) 
The delay time distribution for a promotion to E6 is shown in Figure 
4.  This delay time simulates the individual sailor's performance as well as the 
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Navy’s financial capability to promote sailors. It also incorporates a possibility to 




Figure 4.   Probability to be promoted over time 
c) Sailor Community Behavior 
An initial simulation was run to validate the behavior of the sailor 
community and ensure a steady state of sailors after some period of time.  This 
verifies the proper sailor population dynamics. This initial simulation includes 
growth and aging. To simulate growth, every sailor leaving the simulation is 
replaced by a new E4 with 16 months of TIS. Sailors leave the simulation 
community when they reach the attrition date or a High Year Tenure (HYT) limit 
(Table 4.  ). 
Rank HYT 
E4 10 years 
E5 20 years 
E6 20 years 
Table 4.   HYT limits by rank (From Navy.mil, 2002) 
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After aging the sailor community, the shape and structure should be 
similar to the structure of the given community. Several simulation runs over 30 
years have given the following average sailor community structure: 
 
Figure 5.   Diagram of an average sailor community structure after 30 years of 
simulation 
A comparison with the actual AS sailor community shows that the 
simulation meets the goal to simulate growing and aging of a sailor community. 
The structure and rank distribution fits a real sailor community, with a smooth 
transition from rank to rank.  
A plot of the average number of new sailors each month of 
simulation has shown that the simulation has a warm up period of 235 months 
before reaching a nearly steady state. Using this warm up time for the simulation 
guarantees an unbiased sailor community for different simulation runs. The 
unbiased simulation sailor community after a warm up period refelcts a complete 
change of all sailors in the simulation model after 224 months of simulation and 
randomly chosen individual sailor characteristics for every new sailor. 
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2. The Billets 
The simulated billets have to fulfill some basic requirements to reach the 
research goal. The billets have to be distributed over different regions to make 
sailors move to get there. Each billet has to require a particular rank of a sailor. 
Further, the billet has to be on a type of platform to give the possibility to offer 
platform of choice as an NMI. With all these requirements, a set of billets was 
created that fits the given sailor community (Figure 2.  ). The used regions are: 
Region Description 
CEC This billet is located in the Central East Coast  
CGC This billet is located in the Central Gulf Coast  
CNW This billet is located in the Central North West coast 
CSW This billet is located in the Central South West coast 
Table 5.   Regions used for billets 
This region setup is identical to the one used in Stitt’s optimization model. 
(Stitt, December 2009). This simulation model does not differentiate between 
region and homeport. This level of detail is hidden for simplification reasons. The 
distances used to calculate moving costs between these regions are the 
distances between the main Navy ports within the region. These are Norfolk, VA; 
Mayport, FL; Everett, WA; and San Diego, CA. The platform types that used in 
the simulation model are: 
Platform type Description 
CVN Carrier Vessel, Nuclear (sea) 
LCS Littoral Combat ship (sea) 
LHD Amphibious assault ship (sea) 
LPD Amphibious transport docks (sea)  
NAS Naval Aviation Station (shore) 
Other Other type of shore billet (school…) 
Table 6.   Type of Platforms 
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With both the regions and the platform types, a simulated Navy was 
designed for the simulated sailor community. This simulated Navy should not be 
a copy of a part of the U.S. Navy. The goal is to simulate an assignment process 
that faces similar constraints to that of the U.S. Navy’s detailer assignment 
process. The billet structure is presented in the next figure. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Diagram of the organization of billets used in the simulation 
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The numbers under the regions are the number of billets within the region. 
The numbers under a type of platform are the numbers of billets that require an 
E4, E5 or E6, respectively. Both the simulated sailor community and the 
simulated Navy are the inputs for the assignment process described in the next 
section. 
C. ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
The assignment process is a monthly recurring process in the Navy as 
well as in the simulation. First, the detailer has to identify which sailors require 
reassignment. There are different reasons to assign a sailor to a new billet. The 
main reason to assign sailors to a new billet is the sea-shore cycle. After a set 
time period (called a tour) the sailor needs to be moved to another billet. The 
simulation model uses the tour times for the AS community. (see Table 7.  )  
Tour Sea Shore 
1 36 48 
2 36 48 
3 36 48 
4 36 36 
5 36 36 
6 36 36 
Table 7.   Sea-Shore-Flow in months, AS Community(From Bureau of Navy 
Personnel, 2009) 
If a new assignment is due, the detailer starts nine months in advance to 
find a new billet for the sailor. Other reasons to assign a sailor to a new billet 
could be that a sailor finished his A-School and needs his first billet or a sailor 
was promoted and the rank does not match with the required rank of the billet to 
which he is assigned. When the list of sailors available to move is completed, the 
detailer can match these sailors to the available billets.  
 22
This matching process can be described as a set of rules the detailer 
follows. These rules can be: 
 
 New sailors in the community who are not assigned to a billet should get a 
vacant billet before other sailors who already have an assignment. 
 Sailors who became available to move earlier should be assigned before 
sailors who became available later (first-come, first-serve). 
 The sea-shore indicator has to match with the type of billet to which the 
sailor will be assigned. 
 A sailor only can be assigned to a billet that is free at the time it is needed. 
 The required rank of the billet should fit with the rank of the sailor to avoid 
a mismatch cost. Law allows a mismatch of one pay grade step up or 
down.  
 Finding a new billet within the region where the sailor is located avoids 
moving costs for the Navy. 
These are the rules the simulation model uses to find an assignment. If an 
NMI is awarded to a sailor, additional match criteria, such as a platform choice, 
have to be fulfilled. If a match is found, the detailer can write the sailor’s orders. 
D. USE OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
As soon as a sailor gets his new orders, he can move from one duty 
station to another. This sailor movement causes moving costs, which are 
calculated and recorded in the simulation model. Additionally, depending on the 
fit between the billet and assigned sailor, there can be a mismatch cost. To 
identify differences in costs, the assignment process simulation presented in 
Figure 1.   has to run under different scenarios. These scenarios are the inputs to 
the simulation model. Costs are part of the simulation model output.  Figure 7.   
outlines the assignment process in the simulation model. The following two 
paragraphs explain the simulation model’s inputs and outputs. 
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Figure 7.   The assignment process in the simulation model. 
1. Inputs to the Simulation Model 
The simulation model counts costs per assignment and other measured 
values over a specified period. To run a scenario with the simulation model, 
scenario inputs are required. These inputs include: 
 Simulation time and beginning of documentation: The simulation 
model identifies cost over time. The length of time these costs will 
recorded is given by the number of months for the simulation (end 
of experiment) and the starting point for documentation. Because of 
the simulation model’s warm-up period, the starting point for 
documentation should be greater than 240 months.  
 Number of scenarios: The simulation model allows the user to run 
several scenarios with an identical set-up. This number of 










 Type of NMI offered: The type of NMI that a sailor can chose after 
his first service obligation in a scenario is another input to the 
simulation model. 
 Percentage of sailors awarded an NMI: To test the influence of 
increasing NMIs given to the sailors, the percentage of NMIs 
awarded has to be specified in the simulation model. 
2. Outputs from the Simulation Model 
The simulation model is designed to identify the costs of NMIs that are 
related to the assignment process and the constraints placed when offering these 
NMIs. To answer the research question in this thesis, the assignment costs 
relevant to the simulation results have to be calculated. To calculate the cost of 
assignments, this thesis uses Stitt’s cost elements (Stitt, December 2009). In 
addition to the total costs, the simulation model documents several different 
output values. These values include: 
 Average PCS Cost: An average moving cost per assignment.  
 Number of assignments: The number of all assignments between 
the beginning and end of the documentation period in an 
experiment.  
 Average waiting time: The average delay time per assignment. The 
delay time is months it takes the detailer to assign a sailor after the 
sailor is scheduled to fill a new billet.  
 Number of NMIs awarded: The number of NMIs awarded within the 
sailor community in an experiment. 
 Number of assignments in the presence of NMIs: Number of 
assignments satisfying the additional matching criteria imposed by 
the NMIs offered. 
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 Average waiting time of NMI assignments: Average delay time for 
assignments constrained by the additional NMI matching criteria. 
 Mismatch Costs: Costs that measure the misfit between billets and 
the assigned sailors.  
The costs of the different types of NMIs explained in Chapter II are presented in 



























The simulation model described in Chapter III was used to run several 
scenarios.  The simulation model set up and methods for calculating results are 
presented in section B. Results are presented in sections C. and D.   
B. EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW 
1. Set Up 
As shown in Chapter III, the simulation model needs a warm up period of 
240 months. After simulating 240 months, the data can be collected. The length 
of simulation period is related to the variance of the results. The average cost the 
system identifies becomes more constant over time. A limitation in the simulation 
duration is the computer time required to run a simulation. This time varies by the 
type of NMI offered and the percentage of NMI use.  
All experiments used in this thesis have a simulation time of 360 months. 
The starting point to collecting data was fixed at 240 months. This leads to a 120 
month (10 year) period for data collection. A set of scenarios in this thesis include 
25 simulation runs. 
2. Output Measures 
The output measures are the outputs of the simulation model as described 
in Chapter III.4.B.. The units of measurement are presented in Table 8.   
 
Output measure Unit of Measurement 
Average PCS Cost Average $ per Assignment 
Waiting Time Month 
NMI Assignment Waiting Time Month 
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Output measure Unit of Measurement 
Average Mismatch Cost Average $ per Billet and Month 
Number of Assignments Absolute Number of Assignments 
in Period of Interest 
Number of NMIs Absolute Number of NMI given to 
Sailors in Period of Interest  
Table 8.    Units of Measurement of Output measures 
3. Scenario Description 
The simulation model explored different scenarios. The first simulation 
runs evaluated the baseline scenario. Then, the different NMIs (see Section II, 
Paragraph C.1 of Chapter II.) were added as constraints to the simulation model. 
Each of these NMIs was tested at different levels of NMI use. The levels of NMI 
use were 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%. Section C of this chapter presents 
the baseline results. The different scenario results are presented in Section D. 
4. Statistical Tests 
A multiple comparison method was used to test if there are statistically 
significant changes in means between different scenarios and between different 
levels of NMI use. The chosen test is the Tukey’s test. Tukey’s test is very similar 
to the t-test. The difference is that the Tukey’s test corrects for the probability of 
increasing type I errors if multiple comparisons are made. The test statistic used 





Tukey’s test “determines a critical number such that, if any pair of sample 
means has a difference greater than this number, we conclude that the pair’s two 
corresponding population means are different.”(Keller, 2005) The critical number 
is described by: 
 
Where n is the number of observation, ν is the degrees of freedom associated 
with MSE, ng is the number of observations in each of k samples, α is level of 
significance and qα is the critical value for the given degrees of freedom. 
All statistical test results are presented in Appendix A. 
C. BASELINE SCENARIO TESTING 
To form a system performance baseline, the first simulation runs excluded 
all NMIs. The results are presented in Table 9.   
 
Values Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
 Average 
Number  of 
Assignments per 
Simulation 








4.89 0.23 0.05 4.79 4.98
Average 
Mismatch Cost 
per Billet and 
Month 
388.27 8.10 1.62 384.93 391.61
Table 9.   Results of baseline testing 
The number of assignments was as expected and matches with the 
number of assignments a detailer makes in a ten years period for this community 
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size, according to Richard Schlegel.(Schlegel, 2000)  Because of the 
simplification in the simulated Navy, there are no validation data for the PCS 
Cost and Mismatch Cost. Both depend on the simulation model’s sailor-billet fit. 
Further, the simulation model has an average waiting time of 4.89 months 
for a sailor assignment. The reason for this relatively high value is related to the 
sailor - billet fit in the simulation model. New sailors in the simulation model have 
to fill a sea billet as their first assignment. Because there are fewer sea billets 
than sailors entering the simulation, most of the waiting time reflects new sailors 
waiting in the queue. Assigning sailors to billets that are in use, as happens in the 
U.S. Navy, is precluded in the simulation model. Therefore, the waiting time is 
higher and not comparable to real data, however, it will be relevant for 
comparison with other scenarios.  The waiting time is a measure of the sailor-
billet fit and shows how constraints will affect the assignment process itself. 
Changes in waiting time from the baseline scenario will reflect longer wait times 
in reality. Increasing waiting time can also decrease the sailor’s motivation.    
Because of the restriction, that the number of sailors is always smaller 
than the number of billets, any waiting time for a new sailor implies an empty 
billet elsewhere in the system. Empty billets, as well as billets filled by sailors with 
mismatching ranks, create a mismatch cost (see Section C, Paragraph 2.b. in 
Chapter II.) 
This mismatch cost is an average mismatch cost per billet per month. The 
total mismatch cost equals the average mismatch cost times the months of 
simulation times the number of billets (there are 553 billets in this simulation 
model).  
D. RESULTS OF SCENARIO TESTING 
In further scenarios, the simulation model measured changes in behavior 
and costs after offering different NMIs.  
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1. Overview 
The following paragraphs present the results from offering a single or 
combination of NMIs where the simulation model identifies statistically significant 
changes in mean values for the output measures of interests. The NMIs include 
Homeport of Choice (HP), Platform of Choice (PF), Regional Stability (RS) and 
combinations of these, as introduced in Table 2.  The next paragraph 
concentrates on presenting total PCS Cost and PCS Cost per NMI. The following 
sections presents the Mismatch Cost.  
2. PCS Cost 
a) Total PCS Costs 
Offering Homeport of Choice has a significant impact on the PCS 
costs. The mean comparison test shows that the average PCS Costs change 
significantly if more than 10% of the sailors choose this option. This leads to an 
increase in the total PCS cost. Total PCS costs are calculated by the following 
equation: 
 
The Total PCS Cost for Homeport of Choice are presented in 
Figure 8.  These results reflect the detailers’ assignment priorities.  Detailers are 
modeled as economizing on moving costs.  If there is a suitable assignment in 
the same or a neighboring region, that assignment receives priority.  With 
Homeport of Choice, detailers have be constrained to moving sailors to a more 
distant location when a closer suitable assignment is available; it might also 
require moving another sailor who could have been assigned locally, because his 
possible billet s given to a sailor who has chosen the NMI Homeport of Choice. 
The Regional Stability NMI guarantee a sailor will stay in the 
assigned region for two tours. Not moving sailors should reduce the PCS Cost, 
though it could have the secondary effect of increasing PCS costs for other 
sailors. The results indeed show a decrease in PCS Cost if the detailer is 
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constrained to retain sailors within a region for two tours. If 20 percent or more 
sailors use this NMI, there is a statistically significant decrease in average PCS 
cost. (See Figure 8.  ) 
 
Figure 8.   Total PCS Cost in millions $ for a 10 year period 
As Figure 8.  Figure 9.  shows, offering Regional Stability can save 
PCS Costs. These cost savings are possible, because the detailer’s rules to find 
a match have a higher priority for matching ranks match than to economize on 
PCS costs. This rule was implemented into the simulation model as a constraint 
to minimize mismatch costs. When sailors chose the Regional Stability NMI, the 
detailer has to prioritize the regional match more often. 
Offering Platform of Choice leads to no statistically significant 
changes in the means of average PCS Cost. This is the reason, why the total 
PCS Cost values for this NMI are omitted from Figure 8.   
If Platform of Choice and Homeport of Choice are offered 
simultaneously, the sailor will chose a specific platform in the preferred region. 
The PCS costs in the simulation model with these combined constraints do not 
match the results when Homeport of Choice is the only NMI offered. We see an  
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increase in average PCS cost while offering Homeport of choice, there is a 
decrease in PCS cost when we offer Homeport of Choice in conjunction with 
Platform of Choice. 
This savings result from changing the detailing priorities. These 
savings are possible, because of the given misfit between the sailor community 
and the set of billets. Normally sailors are assigned to a sea billet for their first 
tour and a shore billet for the second tour. Because of the limited number of 
shore billets, many sailors have to move for their second tour.  Some sailors will 
choose a sea billet for their second tour if given the choice of platform. This 
allows the detailer to assign more sailors within the region they are stationed. 
Assignments within a region reduce total PCS Costs.  
Offering all NMIs at the same time means the sailor can decide 
where he wants to serve, on what platform and will remain in this location for the 
next two tours. The reduction in PCS Costs from staying in the same region for 
two tours occurs here again.  The total PCS costs decrease because fewer 
sailors have to move. The total PCS cost for the community of sailors for the 10 
year simulation decreases as the NMI use increases. The results are depicted in 
Figure 8.   
b) PCS Cost per NMI 
The change of total PCS Costs for increasing NMI use can be 
related to the NMIs offered in these experiments, because the NMIs offered is 
the only change. The average cost per NMI is calculated by relating the change 
in total PCS Cost to the number of NMIs offered, as calculated by the equation: 
 
Based on this equation the average PCS Cost per NMI were 
calculated and are presented in Figure 9.   
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Figure 9.   PCS Cost per NMI at different level of NMI use (Circled data points 
are based on means that are not statistically significantly different then the 
base line means) 
The PCS Cost per NMI for the combination of Homeport, Platform 
and Regional Stability in Figure 9.  levels out after 30% of NMI use. This depends 
on the decrease of assignments per month depending on an increasing waiting 
time and an independent linear increase of waiting time for NMIs that are used.  
3. Mismatch Cost 
a) Waiting Time 
The simulation model identifies statistically significantly fewer 
assignments for higher levels of NMI use for the NMI Platform of Choice and NMI 
combinations including Platform of Choice. The decrease in the number of 
assignments reflects an increasing waiting time, the time a sailor has to wait after 
he should have been assigned a new billet. Offering Platform of Choice appears 
to make it harder for the detailer to find assignments for all sailors. The average 
waiting time is presented in Figure 10.   
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Figure 10.   Average Waiting time at different levels of NMI use. 
This increase in waiting time also leads to an increase in mismatch 
cost.  
b) Total Mismatch Cost 
The Total Mismatch Cost are calculate by the following equation 
 
As opposed to PCS Costs, Mismatch Costs are not real costs. The 
mismatch cost reflects the sailor-billet-fit. The mismatch cost occurs when sailors 
and billets have mismatching ranks, either filling a billet with a presumably 
overqualified sailor, which wastes some of the sailor’s skills, or filling a billet with 
an underqualified sailor, which presumably compromises job performance.  
These costs are measured by the pay difference between the billet’s required 
pay graqde and the salior’s actual pay grade.  The sailor community structure 
does not depend on the assignment fit or the waiting time (e.g., increasing 
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mismatches and waiting time do not decrease retention). However, a longer 
waiting times and more frequent sailor-billet-misfits, will likely decrease 
motivation and job satisfaction. The Total Mismatch Costs are presented in 
Figure 11.   
 
Figure 11.   Total Mismatch Cost in a ten year period 
Assignment quality (sailor-billet-fit) is almost the same when 
offering Platform of Choice and the combination of Platform and Homeport of 
Choice. All of the means of Mismatch Costs are statistically significant compared 
to the baseline value.  
Offering the NMI Homeport of Choice or the NMI Regional Stability 
leads to no statistically significant changes in average mismatch cost values.  
c) Mismatch Cost Per NMI 
The increase in the average mismatch costs per billet depends on 
the NMIs used. Dividing the increase in total mismatch cost for a given NMI use 
by the number of NMIs awarded, provides the cost per NMI.  
The Mismatch Cost per NMI over the different levels of NMI use for 
the NMIs that include Platform of Choice are presented below: 
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Figure 12.   Mismatch Cost per NMI over levels of NMI use 
Holding the sailors a second tour in the region on the same type of 
platform shows a lower Mismatch Cost per NMI, than turning them back after one 
tour into the regular sea-shore-rotation.  
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The simulation model appears to successfully measure changes in 
different outcome indicators in the complex assignment process. The simulation 
model behaves in an expected way it confronts increasing constraints (here 
NMIs) that influence the assignment process. An example of expected behavior 
is the decreasing average in mean of PCS Cost if more sailors have to stay for a 
longer time in the same location.  
The final chapter will summarize the results, discuss limitations of the 


























Offering sailors NMIs that affect the assignment process will have varied 
effects on the Navy’s complex organization. It is almost impossible to identify one 
price that could be cited for an NMI. The results give an impression about the 
complexity of the considerations facing a detailer. This thesis reports results from 
a simulation model that counted steady-state costs over 10 years for a stylized 
Navy community. Very often, the changes in measurable values for small levels 
of NMIs use were not statistically significant.  The simulation model identified the 
cost of different NMIs by adding them one by one as input constraints to the 
simulation model. Table 10.  summarizes the results of Chapter IV.  
It should be noted that the costs per NMI reported here are average costs 
for that NMI or combination of NMIs over the entire sample for the entire time 
period.  The costs for any individual sailor will likely be higher or lower than this 
average cost.  Thus, some sailors will over pay for the NMI and some will under 
pay.  Furthermore, some may have values that exceed the specific cost to 
provide them the NMI but are less than the average cost.  Using average cost in 
the CRAM model will preclude those sailors from receiving the NMI.  The 
difficulty is that the cost to provide one sailor an NMI can’t be separated from the 
overall system costs as the costs are interrelated.  Therefore, the only alternative 
is to infer the average cost of the NMI on every sailor. 
A. SUMMARY 
The simulation model designed to identify the costs of NMI worked well. 
The chosen scenario definitions are a compromise between lower variances and 
higher statistical significances in changes of measurable values on the one hand, 
and much longer simulation times on the other hand. This compromise leads to a 
problem with small numbers in the lower levels of NMI use. The cost per NMI is 
calculated by using the number of NMIs awarded. For the 5% level of NMI use 
these are 22.5 NMIs with a standard deviation of 5.2 (Platform of Choice). 
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Because of this high standard deviation, the lower levels of NMI use are often not 
statistically significant in the changes in means. An overview on the costs and 
impacts side of the NMIs that were tested by the simulation model are presented 
in Table 10.   
 
NMI Type PCS Cost/ NMI 
(level of use) 
Mismatch Cost/ 






~$2000 (>=10%)  0 0 
Platform of Choice 0 $ 45k (10%) down 
to 
$ 30k (50%)  
negative 
Homeport and 








Regional Stability ~-$1600 ( >=10%) 0 0 
Regional Stability 
in a Region of 
Choice 
~$800 ( >=40%) 0 0 
Stability in a 
Region and on a 




~$22k (all) negative 
Table 10.   Cost and Impacts of NMIs to the Navy and the sailor community 
The experiments have shown values for the different NMI types. With 
these values in mind, the CRAM can be implemented with NMI costs 
predetermined. But as shown in the example above, it will be up to the detailer to 
classify the sailors’ preferences before value them into a category of NMI type.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The simulation model concentrates on measurable values in the 
assignment process. This research gives no insight into the possible increase in 
motivation of sailors and resulting benefits of increased motivation. Here, further 
research has to be done. 
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Offering NMIs in an auction is like selling them. If these incentives are sold 
to sailors, there is a risk of losing the motivational benefits of NMIs. Even worse, 
this could lead to a competition between sailors, i.e. to get a popular job. This 
competition might have an impact on interpersonal relationships, which can lead 
to dissatisfaction in the sailor community (Kohn, 1993).  On the other hand, it is 
also possible that giving sailors a greater choice in determining their 
individualized retention incentive packages will increase morale and intrinsic 
motivation. 
Beside the calculated costs, the simulation model gives insights into the 
organizational behavior if constraints are added. The simulation model uses a 
different set of rules to find assignments for sailors. Even without offering NMIs, 
this model can be used to vary these rules. This might be helpful to provide 
detailers with policies to use their resources efficiently. 
Offering the labor force NMIs is essential to be an attractive organization 
in the labor market. Recognizing regional preferences of the employees in a 
large organization, such as the Navy, and realizing them will increase the 


























A. STATISTICAL RESULTS 
1. Baseline Results 
 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2367.18 63.2618 12.652 2341.1 2393.3
 





Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2229.08 36.5193 7.3039 2214.0 2244.2
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 4.88853 0.230337 0.04607 4.7935 4.9836
 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 388.269 8.09728 1.6195 384.93 391.61
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2. Scenario Test Results  
a)  Statistical Results of Testing Type 1 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2367.18 63.2618 12.652 2341.1 2393.3
5 25 2395.39 61.6685 12.334 2369.9 2420.8
10 25 2394.60 75.5024 15.100 2363.4 2425.8
20 25 2454.54 79.8423 15.968 2421.6 2487.5
30 25 2490.28 71.1343 14.227 2460.9 2519.6
40 25 2505.05 48.1324 9.626 2485.2 2524.9
50 25 2544.39 58.9551 11.791 2520.1 2568.7
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 5 10 0 
50 -55.9314 -16.5957 -1.82126 33.9185 93.07147 93.86153 121.278 
40 -16.5957 -55.9314 -41.1569 -5.41716 53.73581 54.52587 81.94231 
30 -1.82126 -41.1569 -55.9314 -20.1916 38.96133 39.75139 67.16783 
20 33.9185 -5.41716 -20.1916 -55.9314 3.221571 4.011635 31.42807 
5 93.07147 53.73581 38.96133 3.221571 -55.9314 -55.1413 -27.7249 
10 93.86153 54.52587 39.75139 4.011635 -55.1413 -55.9314 -28.515 
0 121.278 81.94231 67.16783 31.42807 -27.7249 -28.515 -55.9314 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2229.08 36.5193 7.3039 2214.0 2244.2
5 25 2226.08 41.4788 8.2958 2209.0 2243.2
10 25 2230.84 29.4218 5.8844 2218.7 2243.0
20 25 2224.80 29.3598 5.8720 2212.7 2236.9
30 25 2226.00 35.9108 7.1822 2211.2 2240.8
40 25 2223.20 29.8315 5.9663 2210.9 2235.5
50 25 2217.20 35.5622 7.1124 2202.5 2231.9
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 10 0 5 30 20 40 50 
10 -28.9365 -27.1765 -24.1765 -24.0965 -22.8965 -21.2965 -15.2965 
0 -27.1765 -28.9365 -25.9365 -25.8565 -24.6565 -23.0565 -17.0565 
5 -24.1765 -25.9365 -28.9365 -28.8565 -27.6565 -26.0565 -20.0565 
30 -24.0965 -25.8565 -28.8565 -28.9365 -27.7365 -26.1365 -20.1365 
20 -22.8965 -24.6565 -27.6565 -27.7365 -28.9365 -27.3365 -21.3365 
40 -21.2965 -23.0565 -26.0565 -26.1365 -27.3365 -28.9365 -22.9365 
50 -15.2965 -17.0565 -20.0565 -20.1365 -21.3365 -22.9365 -28.9365 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 4.88853 0.230337 0.04607 4.7935 4.9836
5 25 4.87181 0.316349 0.06327 4.7412 5.0024
10 25 4.86452 0.235106 0.04702 4.7675 4.9616
20 25 4.84603 0.243897 0.04878 4.7454 4.9467
30 25 4.82950 0.243576 0.04872 4.7290 4.9300
40 25 4.87447 0.229397 0.04588 4.7798 4.9692
50 25 5.00809 0.257078 0.05142 4.9020 5.1142
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 0 40 5 10 20 30 
50 -0.21305 -0.0935 -0.07944 -0.07678 -0.06948 -0.051 -0.03447 
0 -0.0935 -0.21305 -0.199 -0.19634 -0.18904 -0.17056 -0.15403 
40 -0.07944 -0.199 -0.21305 -0.21039 -0.2031 -0.18462 -0.16809 
5 -0.07678 -0.19634 -0.21039 -0.21305 -0.20576 -0.18728 -0.17074 
10 -0.06948 -0.18904 -0.2031 -0.20576 -0.21305 -0.19457 -0.17804 
20 -0.051 -0.17056 -0.18462 -0.18728 -0.19457 -0.21305 -0.19652 
30 -0.03447 -0.15403 -0.16809 -0.17074 -0.17804 -0.19652 -0.21305 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 388.269 8.09728 1.6195 384.93 391.61
5 25 387.395 6.58264 1.3165 384.68 390.11
10 25 388.319 7.58366 1.5167 385.19 391.45
20 25 391.076 7.24736 1.4495 388.08 394.07
30 25 389.057 7.32629 1.4653 386.03 392.08
40 25 392.017 9.03597 1.8072 388.29 395.75
50 25 390.834 6.40531 1.2811 388.19 393.48
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 40 20 50 30 10 0 5 
40 -6.3432 -5.40222 -5.15993 -3.38354 -2.64513 -2.5953 -1.72121 
20 -5.40222 -6.3432 -6.10091 -4.32451 -3.58611 -3.53628 -2.66218 
50 -5.15993 -6.10091 -6.3432 -4.5668 -3.8284 -3.77857 -2.90447 
30 -3.38354 -4.32451 -4.5668 -6.3432 -5.6048 -5.55496 -4.68087 
10 -2.64513 -3.58611 -3.8284 -5.6048 -6.3432 -6.29337 -5.41927 
0 -2.5953 -3.53628 -3.77857 -5.55496 -6.29337 -6.3432 -5.4691 
5 -1.72121 -2.66218 -2.90447 -4.68087 -5.41927 -5.4691 -6.3432 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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b) Statistical Results of Testing Type 2 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2367.18 63.2618 12.652 2341.1 2393.3
5 25 2348.94 57.5989 11.520 2325.2 2372.7
10 25 2315.32 74.9336 14.987 2284.4 2346.2
20 25 2273.71 75.8448 15.169 2242.4 2305.0
30 25 2286.60 73.9191 14.784 2256.1 2317.1
40 25 2338.47 62.8071 12.561 2312.5 2364.4
50 25 2375.28 80.6727 16.135 2342.0 2408.6
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 0 5 40 10 30 20 
50 -59.3494 -51.2527 -33.011 -22.5402 0.611942 29.32358 42.2176 
0 -51.2527 -59.3494 -41.1077 -30.6369 -7.48479 21.22685 34.12087 
5 -33.011 -41.1077 -59.3494 -48.8786 -25.7265 2.985155 15.87917 
40 -22.5402 -30.6369 -48.8786 -59.3494 -36.1973 -7.48567 5.408344 
10 0.611942 -7.48479 -25.7265 -36.1973 -59.3494 -30.6378 -17.7438 
30 29.32358 21.22685 2.985155 -7.48567 -30.6378 -59.3494 -46.4554 
20 42.2176 34.12087 15.87917 5.408344 -17.7438 -46.4554 -59.3494 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2229.08 36.5193 7.3039 2214.0 2244.2
5 25 2254.44 34.0894 6.8179 2240.4 2268.5
10 25 2233.44 41.4699 8.2940 2216.3 2250.6
20 25 2217.28 42.2853 8.4571 2199.8 2234.7
30 25 2198.56 35.0168 7.0034 2184.1 2213.0
40 25 2173.08 26.1565 5.2313 2162.3 2183.9
50 25 2135.88 42.9741 8.5948 2118.1 2153.6
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 5 10 0 20 30 40 50 
5 -31.5205 -10.5205 -6.16049 5.639509 24.35951 49.83951 87.03951 
10 -10.5205 -31.5205 -27.1605 -15.3605 3.359509 28.83951 66.03951 
0 -6.16049 -27.1605 -31.5205 -19.7205 -1.00049 24.47951 61.67951 
20 5.639509 -15.3605 -19.7205 -31.5205 -12.8005 12.67951 49.87951 
30 24.35951 3.359509 -1.00049 -12.8005 -31.5205 -6.04049 31.15951 
40 49.83951 28.83951 24.47951 12.67951 -6.04049 -31.5205 5.679509 
50 87.03951 66.03951 61.67951 49.87951 31.15951 5.679509 -31.5205 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 4.88853 0.230337 0.04607 4.7935 4.9836
5 25 4.94318 0.271888 0.05438 4.8310 5.0554
10 25 5.12869 0.284747 0.05695 5.0112 5.2462
20 25 5.60309 0.229224 0.04584 5.5085 5.6977
30 25 6.01391 0.366370 0.07327 5.8627 6.1651
40 25 6.36939 0.239341 0.04787 6.2706 6.4682
50 25 6.87134 0.329929 0.06599 6.7351 7.0075
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 10 5 0 
50 -0.23896 0.26299 0.618468 1.029283 1.503689 1.689197 1.743849 
40 0.26299 -0.23896 0.11652 0.527335 1.001741 1.187249 1.241901 
30 0.618468 0.11652 -0.23896 0.171858 0.646264 0.831771 0.886423 
20 1.029283 0.527335 0.171858 -0.23896 0.235448 0.420955 0.475608 
10 1.503689 1.001741 0.646264 0.235448 -0.23896 -0.05345 0.001202 
5 1.689197 1.187249 0.831771 0.420955 -0.05345 -0.23896 -0.18431 
0 1.743849 1.241901 0.886423 0.475608 0.001202 -0.18431 -0.23896 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 388.269 8.0973 1.6195 384.93 391.61
5 25 402.233 6.4073 1.2815 399.59 404.88
10 25 417.301 11.3638 2.2728 412.61 421.99
20 25 441.290 8.0479 1.6096 437.97 444.61
30 25 460.217 8.5449 1.7090 456.69 463.74
40 25 478.098 8.1437 1.6287 474.74 481.46
50 25 489.724 8.6301 1.7260 486.16 493.29
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 10 5 0 
50 -7.23564 4.390571 22.27167 41.19817 65.18804 80.25566 94.21965 
40 4.390571 -7.23564 10.64547 29.57196 53.56183 68.62945 82.59345 
30 22.27167 10.64547 -7.23564 11.69086 35.68073 50.74835 64.71235 
20 41.19817 29.57196 11.69086 -7.23564 16.75423 31.82185 45.78585 
10 65.18804 53.56183 35.68073 16.75423 -7.23564 7.831982 21.79598 
5 80.25566 68.62945 50.74835 31.82185 7.831982 -7.23564 6.72836 
0 94.21965 82.59345 64.71235 45.78585 21.79598 6.72836 -7.23564 
 




c) Statistical Results of Testing Type 3 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2367.18 63.2618 12.652 2341.1 2393.3
5 25 2336.33 73.3801 14.676 2306.0 2366.6
10 25 2298.16 59.0625 11.812 2273.8 2322.5
20 25 2279.22 65.4666 13.093 2252.2 2306.2
30 25 2269.75 75.5613 15.112 2238.6 2300.9
40 25 2294.12 67.2696 13.454 2266.4 2321.9
50 25 2285.49 88.5512 17.710 2248.9 2322.0
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 0 5 10 40 50 20 30 
0 -59.8898 -29.0373 9.12551 13.16763 21.80104 28.06892 37.54515 
5 -29.0373 -59.8898 -21.727 -17.6849 -9.05147 -2.78359 6.692643 
10 9.12551 -21.727 -59.8898 -55.8477 -47.2142 -40.9464 -31.4701 
40 13.16763 -17.6849 -55.8477 -59.8898 -51.2564 -44.9885 -35.5123 
50 21.80104 -9.05147 -47.2142 -51.2564 -59.8898 -53.6219 -44.1457 
20 28.06892 -2.78359 -40.9464 -44.9885 -53.6219 -59.8898 -50.4135 
30 37.54515 6.692643 -31.4701 -35.5123 -44.1457 -50.4135 -59.8898 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2229.08 36.5193 7.3039 2214.0 2244.2
5 25 2236.44 33.2855 6.6571 2222.7 2250.2
10 25 2228.64 30.0720 6.0144 2216.2 2241.1
20 25 2213.60 37.8275 7.5655 2198.0 2229.2
30 25 2197.00 37.5433 7.5087 2181.5 2212.5
40 25 2162.88 29.3148 5.8630 2150.8 2175.0
50 25 2127.64 35.8932 7.1786 2112.8 2142.5
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 
5 -29.126 -21.766 -21.326 -6.28596 10.31404 44.43404 79.67404 
0 -21.766 -29.126 -28.686 -13.646 2.954036 37.07404 72.31404 
10 -21.326 -28.686 -29.126 -14.086 2.514036 36.63404 71.87404 
20 -6.28596 -13.646 -14.086 -29.126 -12.526 21.59404 56.83404 
30 10.31404 2.954036 2.514036 -12.526 -29.126 4.994036 40.23404 
40 44.43404 37.07404 36.63404 21.59404 4.994036 -29.126 6.114036 
50 79.67404 72.31404 71.87404 56.83404 40.23404 6.114036 -29.126 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 4.88853 0.230337 0.04607 4.7935 4.9836
5 25 4.95102 0.222821 0.04456 4.8590 5.0430
10 25 5.30658 0.222849 0.04457 5.2146 5.3986
20 25 5.66651 0.263607 0.05272 5.5577 5.7753
30 25 6.10061 0.342898 0.06858 5.9591 6.2422
40 25 6.58977 0.269051 0.05381 6.4787 6.7008
50 25 7.10913 0.214329 0.04287 7.0207 7.1976
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 10 5 0 
50 -0.21586 0.303498 0.792654 1.226761 1.586691 1.942251 2.00474 
40 0.303498 -0.21586 0.273297 0.707403 1.067333 1.422893 1.485382 
30 0.792654 0.273297 -0.21586 0.218247 0.578177 0.933737 0.996226 
20 1.226761 0.707403 0.218247 -0.21586 0.14407 0.49963 0.562119 
10 1.586691 1.067333 0.578177 0.14407 -0.21586 0.1397 0.202189 
5 1.942251 1.422893 0.933737 0.49963 0.1397 -0.21586 -0.15337 
0 2.00474 1.485382 0.996226 0.562119 0.202189 -0.15337 -0.21586 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 388.269 8.0973 1.6195 384.93 391.61
5 25 399.857 6.9805 1.3961 396.98 402.74
10 25 415.010 7.2835 1.4567 412.00 418.02
20 25 440.557 9.4119 1.8824 436.67 444.44
30 25 461.223 7.3008 1.4602 458.21 464.24
40 25 477.281 8.3334 1.6667 473.84 480.72
50 25 493.374 11.4787 2.2957 488.64 498.11
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 10 5 0 
50 -7.20813 8.885598 24.94317 45.60905 71.15654 86.30931 97.89736 
40 8.885598 -7.20813 8.849441 29.51532 55.06281 70.21557 81.80362 
30 24.94317 8.849441 -7.20813 13.45775 39.00523 54.158 65.74605 
20 45.60905 29.51532 13.45775 -7.20813 18.33935 33.49212 45.08017 
10 71.15654 55.06281 39.00523 18.33935 -7.20813 7.944634 19.53268 
5 86.30931 70.21557 54.158 33.49212 7.944634 -7.20813 4.379916 
0 97.89736 81.80362 65.74605 45.08017 19.53268 4.379916 -7.20813 
 




d) Statistical Results of Testing Type 4 
 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2367.18 63.2618 12.652 2341.1 2393.3
5 25 2365.76 75.3156 15.063 2334.7 2396.9
10 25 2324.37 70.7939 14.159 2295.2 2353.6
20 25 2301.34 56.5256 11.305 2278.0 2324.7
30 25 2246.55 66.7266 13.345 2219.0 2274.1
40 25 2221.44 57.4528 11.491 2197.7 2245.2
50 25 2162.61 58.0005 11.600 2138.7 2186.6
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 0 5 10 20 30 40 50 
0 -54.3304 -52.9127 -11.5244 11.51199 66.30351 91.40903 150.2375 
5 -52.9127 -54.3304 -12.9421 10.09425 64.88578 89.99129 148.8197 
10 -11.5244 -12.9421 -54.3304 -31.294 23.49752 48.60304 107.4315 
20 11.51199 10.09425 -31.294 -54.3304 0.461129 25.56665 84.39507 
30 66.30351 64.88578 23.49752 0.461129 -54.3304 -29.2249 29.60355 
40 91.40903 89.99129 48.60304 25.56665 -29.2249 -54.3304 4.498027 
50 150.2375 148.8197 107.4315 84.39507 29.60355 4.498027 -54.3304 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2229.08 36.5193 7.3039 2214.0 2244.2
5 25 2229.68 35.9881 7.1976 2214.8 2244.5
10 25 2243.24 41.6196 8.3239 2226.1 2260.4
20 25 2230.04 27.9918 5.5984 2218.5 2241.6
30 25 2232.60 33.5857 6.7171 2218.7 2246.5
40 25 2216.84 32.2899 6.4580 2203.5 2230.2
50 25 2215.92 39.0554 7.8111 2199.8 2232.0
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 10 30 20 5 0 40 50 
10 -29.998 -19.358 -16.798 -16.438 -15.838 -3.59797 -2.67797 
30 -19.358 -29.998 -27.438 -27.078 -26.478 -14.238 -13.318 
20 -16.798 -27.438 -29.998 -29.638 -29.038 -16.798 -15.878 
5 -16.438 -27.078 -29.638 -29.998 -29.398 -17.158 -16.238 
0 -15.838 -26.478 -29.038 -29.398 -29.998 -17.758 -16.838 
40 -3.59797 -14.238 -16.798 -17.158 -17.758 -29.998 -29.078 
50 -2.67797 -13.318 -15.878 -16.238 -16.838 -29.078 -29.998 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 4.88853 0.230337 0.04607 4.7935 4.9836
5 25 4.77211 0.304370 0.06087 4.6465 4.8977
10 25 4.78894 0.191456 0.03829 4.7099 4.8680
20 25 4.85999 0.246995 0.04940 4.7580 4.9619
30 25 4.89713 0.236504 0.04730 4.7995 4.9948
40 25 4.99719 0.202917 0.04058 4.9134 5.0810
50 25 5.05373 0.272610 0.05452 4.9412 5.1663
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 0 20 10 5 
50 -0.20548 -0.14894 -0.04888 -0.04028 -0.01174 0.059315 0.076139 
40 -0.14894 -0.20548 -0.10542 -0.09681 -0.06828 0.00278 0.019604 
30 -0.04888 -0.10542 -0.20548 -0.19687 -0.16834 -0.09728 -0.08046 
0 -0.04028 -0.09681 -0.19687 -0.20548 -0.17694 -0.10588 -0.08906 
20 -0.01174 -0.06828 -0.16834 -0.17694 -0.20548 -0.13442 -0.11759 
10 0.059315 0.00278 -0.09728 -0.10588 -0.13442 -0.20548 -0.18865 
5 0.076139 0.019604 -0.08046 -0.08906 -0.11759 -0.18865 -0.20548 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 388.269 8.0973 1.6195 384.93 391.61
5 25 393.494 15.1262 3.0252 387.25 399.74
10 25 385.950 16.4776 3.2955 379.15 392.75
20 25 391.720 16.3389 3.2678 384.98 398.46
30 25 391.473 16.4089 3.2818 384.70 398.25
40 25 388.098 17.3785 3.4757 380.92 395.27
50 25 388.105 13.3603 2.6721 382.59 393.62
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 5 20 30 0 50 40 10 
5 -12.6923 -10.919 -10.6713 -7.46755 -7.30345 -7.29696 -5.14881 
20 -10.919 -12.6923 -12.4446 -9.24081 -9.07671 -9.07022 -6.92207 
30 -10.6713 -12.4446 -12.6923 -9.4885 -9.3244 -9.31791 -7.16976 
0 -7.46755 -9.24081 -9.4885 -12.6923 -12.5282 -12.5217 -10.3735 
50 -7.30345 -9.07671 -9.3244 -12.5282 -12.6923 -12.6858 -10.5376 
40 -7.29696 -9.07022 -9.31791 -12.5217 -12.6858 -12.6923 -10.5441 
10 -5.14881 -6.92207 -7.16976 -10.3735 -10.5376 -10.5441 -12.6923 
 




e) Statistical Results of Testing Type 5 
 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2367.18 63.2618 12.652 2341.1 2393.3
5 25 2380.17 66.1035 13.221 2352.9 2407.5
10 25 2366.55 59.8695 11.974 2341.8 2391.3
20 25 2394.05 59.1258 11.825 2369.6 2418.5
30 25 2400.00 58.5660 11.713 2375.8 2424.2
40 25 2447.30 62.3646 12.473 2421.6 2473.0
50 25 2475.08 72.7663 14.553 2445.0 2505.1
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 5 0 10 
50 -53.4497 -25.6705 21.62887 27.58684 41.46464 54.45318 55.07858 
40 -25.6705 -53.4497 -6.15027 -0.19229 13.6855 26.67404 27.29944 
30 21.62887 -6.15027 -53.4497 -47.4917 -33.6139 -20.6254 -20 
20 27.58684 -0.19229 -47.4917 -53.4497 -39.5719 -26.5834 -25.958 
5 41.46464 13.6855 -33.6139 -39.5719 -53.4497 -40.4611 -39.8357 
0 54.45318 26.67404 -20.6254 -26.5834 -40.4611 -53.4497 -52.8243 
10 55.07858 27.29944 -20 -25.958 -39.8357 -52.8243 -53.4497 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2229.08 36.5193 7.3039 2214.0 2244.2
5 25 2233.32 33.1244 6.6249 2219.6 2247.0
10 25 2231.80 35.0678 7.0136 2217.3 2246.3
20 25 2238.24 25.8912 5.1782 2227.6 2248.9
30 25 2215.68 29.5293 5.9059 2203.5 2227.9
40 25 2217.40 34.0478 6.8096 2203.3 2231.5
50 25 2199.72 39.2529 7.8506 2183.5 2215.9
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 20 5 10 0 40 30 50 
20 -28.3628 -23.4428 -21.9228 -19.2028 -7.52284 -5.80284 10.15716 
5 -23.4428 -28.3628 -26.8428 -24.1228 -12.4428 -10.7228 5.237159 
10 -21.9228 -26.8428 -28.3628 -25.6428 -13.9628 -12.2428 3.717159 
0 -19.2028 -24.1228 -25.6428 -28.3628 -16.6828 -14.9628 0.997159 
40 -7.52284 -12.4428 -13.9628 -16.6828 -28.3628 -26.6428 -10.6828 
30 -5.80284 -10.7228 -12.2428 -14.9628 -26.6428 -28.3628 -12.4028 
50 10.15716 5.237159 3.717159 0.997159 -10.6828 -12.4028 -28.3628 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 4.88853 0.230337 0.04607 4.7935 4.9836
5 25 4.82457 0.224280 0.04486 4.7320 4.9171
10 25 4.89035 0.313283 0.06266 4.7610 5.0197
20 25 4.86994 0.185355 0.03707 4.7934 4.9465
30 25 4.95504 0.228365 0.04567 4.8608 5.0493
40 25 4.94224 0.274045 0.05481 4.8291 5.0554
50 25 5.11479 0.296833 0.05937 4.9923 5.2373
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 30 40 10 0 20 5 
50 -0.21431 -0.05457 -0.04176 0.010124 0.011946 0.03053 0.075906 
30 -0.05457 -0.21431 -0.20151 -0.14962 -0.1478 -0.12921 -0.08384 
40 -0.04176 -0.20151 -0.21431 -0.16243 -0.1606 -0.14202 -0.09664 
10 0.010124 -0.14962 -0.16243 -0.21431 -0.21249 -0.19391 -0.14853 
0 0.011946 -0.1478 -0.1606 -0.21249 -0.21431 -0.19573 -0.15035 
20 0.03053 -0.12921 -0.14202 -0.19391 -0.19573 -0.21431 -0.16894 
5 0.075906 -0.08384 -0.09664 -0.14853 -0.15035 -0.16894 -0.21431 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 388.269 8.09728 1.6195 384.93 391.61
5 25 391.262 8.32753 1.6655 387.82 394.70
10 25 389.608 8.70395 1.7408 386.02 393.20
20 25 389.242 7.31713 1.4634 386.22 392.26
30 25 387.454 6.57182 1.3144 384.74 390.17
40 25 386.168 6.69041 1.3381 383.41 388.93
50 25 377.946 8.44460 1.6889 374.46 381.43
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 5 10 20 0 30 40 50 
5 -6.56549 -4.91192 -4.54624 -3.57272 -2.75737 -1.47144 6.750645 
10 -4.91192 -6.56549 -6.19981 -5.2263 -4.41094 -3.12502 5.097073 
20 -4.54624 -6.19981 -6.56549 -5.59198 -4.77662 -3.4907 4.731392 
0 -3.57272 -5.2263 -5.59198 -6.56549 -5.75013 -4.46421 3.757881 
30 -2.75737 -4.41094 -4.77662 -5.75013 -6.56549 -5.27956 2.942525 
40 -1.47144 -3.12502 -3.4907 -4.46421 -5.27956 -6.56549 1.656601 
50 6.750645 5.097073 4.731392 3.757881 2.942525 1.656601 -6.56549 
 




f) Statistical Results of Testing Type 6 
 




Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2367.18 63.2618 12.652 2341.1 2393.3
5 25 2323.33 52.4812 10.496 2301.7 2345.0
10 25 2293.80 72.5163 14.503 2263.9 2323.7
20 25 2237.78 85.5593 17.112 2202.5 2273.1
30 25 2235.46 79.9040 15.981 2202.5 2268.4
40 25 2204.20 83.2951 16.659 2169.8 2238.6
50 25 2163.43 81.7766 16.355 2129.7 2197.2
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 0 5 10 20 30 40 50 
0 -63.285 -19.4301 10.09194 66.11109 68.43418 99.69429 140.4688 
5 -19.4301 -63.285 -33.7629 22.25623 24.57932 55.83943 96.61395 
10 10.09194 -33.7629 -63.285 -7.26585 -4.94276 26.31735 67.09187 
20 66.11109 22.25623 -7.26585 -63.285 -60.9619 -29.7018 11.07273 
30 68.43418 24.57932 -4.94276 -60.9619 -63.285 -32.0249 8.749634 
40 99.69429 55.83943 26.31735 -29.7018 -32.0249 -63.285 -22.5105 
50 140.4688 96.61395 67.09187 11.07273 8.749634 -22.5105 -63.285 
 









Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 2229.08 36.5193 7.3039 2214.0 2244.2
5 25 2236.88 35.2507 7.0501 2222.3 2251.4
10 25 2236.64 27.2594 5.4519 2225.4 2247.9
20 25 2218.56 37.9353 7.5871 2202.9 2234.2
30 25 2193.16 33.9039 6.7808 2179.2 2207.2
40 25 2171.80 42.9942 8.5988 2154.1 2189.5
50 25 2156.84 27.8219 5.5644 2145.4 2168.3
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 5 10 0 20 30 40 50 
5 -29.4673 -29.2273 -21.6673 -11.1473 14.25274 35.61274 50.57274 
10 -29.2273 -29.4673 -21.9073 -11.3873 14.01274 35.37274 50.33274 
0 -21.6673 -21.9073 -29.4673 -18.9473 6.452744 27.81274 42.77274 
20 -11.1473 -11.3873 -18.9473 -29.4673 -4.06726 17.29274 32.25274 
30 14.25274 14.01274 6.452744 -4.06726 -29.4673 -8.10726 6.852744 
40 35.61274 35.37274 27.81274 17.29274 -8.10726 -29.4673 -14.5073 
50 50.57274 50.33274 42.77274 32.25274 6.852744 -14.5073 -29.4673 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 4.88853 0.230337 0.04607 4.7935 4.9836
5 25 4.92245 0.282558 0.05651 4.8058 5.0391
10 25 5.20623 0.275336 0.05507 5.0926 5.3199
20 25 5.55535 0.255381 0.05108 5.4499 5.6608
30 25 6.00220 0.327785 0.06556 5.8669 6.1375
40 25 6.55258 0.404751 0.08095 6.3855 6.7197
50 25 6.98538 0.364631 0.07293 6.8349 7.1359
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 10 5 0 
50 -0.26273 0.17007 0.720452 1.167302 1.516415 1.800198 1.834121 
40 0.17007 -0.26273 0.287649 0.734499 1.083612 1.367395 1.401317 
30 0.720452 0.287649 -0.26273 0.184117 0.53323 0.817013 0.850935 
20 1.167302 0.734499 0.184117 -0.26273 0.08638 0.370163 0.404085 
10 1.516415 1.083612 0.53323 0.08638 -0.26273 0.02105 0.054972 
5 1.800198 1.367395 0.817013 0.370163 0.02105 -0.26273 -0.22881 
0 1.834121 1.401317 0.850935 0.404085 0.054972 -0.22881 -0.26273 
 
Positive values show pairs of means that are significantly different. 
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Means and Std Deviations 
Level Number Mean Std Dev Std Err Mean Lower 95% Upper 95%
0 25 388.269 8.09728 1.6195 384.93 391.61
5 25 397.184 7.06936 1.4139 394.27 400.10
10 25 409.599 8.72038 1.7441 406.00 413.20
20 25 423.930 9.78118 1.9562 419.89 427.97
30 25 436.520 7.78965 1.5579 433.30 439.74
40 25 456.512 9.89473 1.9789 452.43 460.60
50 25 471.148 6.22770 1.2455 468.58 473.72
 
Means Comparisons 




Abs(Dif)-LSD 50 40 30 20 10 5 0 
50 -7.02356 7.613081 27.60458 40.1951 54.52559 66.94054 75.85597 
40 7.613081 -7.02356 12.96794 25.55846 39.88895 52.3039 61.21933 
30 27.60458 12.96794 -7.02356 5.566959 19.89745 32.3124 41.22784 
20 40.1951 25.55846 5.566959 -7.02356 7.306938 19.72189 28.63732 
10 54.52559 39.88895 19.89745 7.306938 -7.02356 5.391391 14.30683 
5 66.94054 52.3039 32.3124 19.72189 5.391391 -7.02356 1.891877 
0 75.85597 61.21933 41.22784 28.63732 14.30683 1.891877 -7.02356 
 









The simulation program is written in the MATLAB programming 
environment. MATLAB allows standard commands such as for, if, while and else. 
Variables do not have to be defined in advance, as in other programming 
languages. Procedures can be saved in “m-files”. The same applies to functions. 
Variables that are used in one procedure can be reused in other procedures, 
because they are global. The only exception is reusing variables within functions. 
If a function needs specific information to operate, this information has to be 
given to the function and the result will be given back by the function. In addition, 
MATLAB offers a set of functions that can be used in programs. Variables or sets 
of variables can be saved in mat-files.  
The simulation is written in the MATLAB environment release 2009.  
The following pages provide the simulation procedures. The main procedures are 
followed by the sub procedures. Finally functions written specifically for this 
model are shown. Before introducing the procedures, the most important 
variables are explained. 
B. VARIABLES 
Most of the variables are matrixes. Each row in these matrixes is a vector. 
Each vector contains a set of data. MATLAB uses data by calling the row and 
column of a variable. Example: In the billet matrix, the row number equals the 
billet identification number. The billet identification number is content of the first 
column. The platform type is written down in the fifth column. This means that 
billets(123,5) equals the platform type of the 123th billet (which is a type 5 billet: 
a NAS billet). 
The complete “billets” vector is: 
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The “sailor_com” vector includes: 
 
 
The ”sailor_without_billet” file contains: 
 
The “empty_billet” vector: 
 
 
The “assignments” matrix contains vectors of: 
 
 




C. MAIN PROCEDURES 
Procedures are considered main procedures when they are used in the 
main monthly assignment loop or are used above this level. All procedures used 
within the main procedures, to make the code more readable, are called sub 
procedures. 
1. Start 
The start procedure has two functions. First, the user is asked for a 
(random) number, which leads to a use of this amount of random numbers to set 
the pattern for the other random numbers. The goal is to start the simulation with 
different random numbers to get different results. MATLAB will use the same 
random number if it is restarted, unless otherwise directed, which leads to 
identical results if all other parameters are the same too. Second the function 
calls the procedure main_prog. The procedure should be used the first time, the 
simulation should be executed.  
% routine to set up the rand generator by using a different number of 
% random numbers 
x=input('put in a random integer between 100 and 10000 ...'); 
for i=1:x 







The main_prog is used to set up the simulation. Inputs such as time, 
number of experiments and type of experiment are required. Further the 
procedure runs the simulation as it is asked for. 
%main routine 
%clearing the memory 
clear 
% reading setting 
%time of one simulation run 
month=input('Month of simulation? '); 
% start point of counting 
start=input('Start point of taking assignments into statistic? '); 
%number of experiments 
sim_number=input('Number of experiments? '); 
% percentage of nmi use 
percent=input('Percentage of NMI use? '); 
% input of nmi that should be simulated 








The sim_run procedure loads variables, further defines new variables and 





%counter that plots the number of new sailors who enter the system 
new_sailors_month=[]; 








%adding 6 more columns to the sailor matrix for later use 
for i=6:11 
    sailor_com(1,i)=0; 
end, 
%sailor distribution after first promotions 
sailor_stat; 










    %first rows include a counter that shows the percentage of month 
    %of simulation done 
    clc 
    percent_done=zaehl*100/(sim_number*month) 
    zaehl=zaehl+1; 
    %begin of simulation loop 
    growth; 
    attrition_proc; 
    promotion; 
    future_assi; 
    find_assi; 
    sailor_move; 
    aging; 
    %next sub procedure proofs if still all billets are in use 
    billet_control; 
    %sub procedure that sums up the mismatch cost for this month 
    sum_mismatch_cost; 
end 






This procedure generates new sailors. The number of new sailors 
corresponds to the number of sailors who left one month earlier. Every new sailor 
gets a random calculated attrition date, promotion date and personal wishes for a 
NMI type, favorite homeport and platform. The used method to calculate these 
random dates is a Monte Carlo simulation. 
%adding the number of new sailors to the system that left earlier 
[k,l]=size(dropout); 
%for loop creates k new sailors 
for i=last_sailor_id+1:last_sailor_id+k 
    r1=rand; 
    r2=rand; 
    % Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the attrition date 
    if (r1>0.6070) 
        attrition_date=240; 
    else 
        m=1; 
 74
        while (m<224) 
            if (r1<attrition(m,2)) 
                attrition_date=attrition(m,1); 
                m=224; 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end, 
        end, 
    end, 
    % Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the next promotion date 
    m=1; 
    while (m<38) 
        if (r2<promo_distrib_5(m,2)) 
            promo_date=35+promo_distrib_5(m,1); 
            m=38; 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end, 
    end, 
    % random NMI use yes/no related to the percentage of NMI offered 
    r=randi(18); 
    r3=rand; 
    if (r3>percent/100) 
        nmi_use=0; 
    else 
        nmi_use=1; 
    end,     
    if (nmi_typ==7) 
        nmit=randi(6); 
    else 
        nmit=nmi_typ; 
    end 
    new_sailor=[ i 16 4 2 1 attrition_date promo_date nmi_use nmit 
pos_pf(r,1) pos_pf(r,2)]; 
    sailor_com=[sailor_com ; new_sailor]; 
    sailor_without_billet=[sailor_without_billet ; i time 1]; 
end, 


















The attrition_proc takes care of all sailors who reach their attrition date or 
the high-year-tenure limitation of their rank. These sailors have to leave the 
system. If these sailors have a billet in use, this billet is considered free and can 
be used for another sailor later.  
%procedure simulates attrition for sailor_com 
[k,l]=size(sailor_com); 
for n=k:-1:1 
    % eliminating sailors who reach their attrition date 
    if (sailor_com(n,2)==sailor_com(n,6)) 
        dropout=[dropout ; sailor_com(n,1)]; 
        b_id=billet_id(billets,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        % if the leaving sailor has a billet he is on, this billet is 
to 
        % called to be free 
        if (b_id>0) 
            empty_billets=add_billet_to_eb(empty_billets, assignments, 
b_id, time); 
            billets(b_id,6)=0; 
        end, 
        
sailor_without_billet=del_sailor_from_swob(sailor_without_billet,sailor
_com(n,1)); 
        
empty_billets=set_future_billet_free(empty_billets,assignments,sailor_c
om(n,1)); 
        assignments=del_sailor_from_assi(assignments,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        sailor_com(n,:)=[]; 
    % eliminating sailors who reach the high year tenure limitation 
    elseif ((sailor_com(n,2)==120) && (sailor_com(n,3)==4)) 
        dropout=[dropout ; sailor_com(n,1)]; 
        b_id=billet_id(billets,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        % if the leaving sailor has a billet he is on, this billet is 
to 
        % called to be free 
        if (b_id>0) 
            empty_billets=add_billet_to_eb(empty_billets, assignments, 
b_id, time); 
            billets(b_id,6)=0; 
        end, 
        
sailor_without_billet=del_sailor_from_swob(sailor_without_billet,sailor
_com(n,1)); 
        
empty_billets=set_future_billet_free(empty_billets,assignments,sailor_c
om(n,1)); 
        assignments=del_sailor_from_assi(assignments,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        sailor_com(n,:)=[]; 









In this procedure, sailors who reach their promotion date get promoted 
and a new promotion date will be calculated. If the sailor has more than 18 
months to go in his tour, and the required rank of his billet is lower than his new 
rank, he will get a new billet. The same adjustment occurs if the required rank is 
more than one rank below his new rank. 
% promotion with calculation of the next promotion date 
[k,l]=size(sailor_com); 
for n=k:-1:1 
    %proof if a sailor can be promoted 
    if (sailor_com(n,2)==sailor_com(n,7)) 
        %Promotion 
        sailor_com(n,3)=sailor_com(n,3)+1; 
        sailor_com(n,4)=0; 
        %calculate time in tour (Sea-Shore) 
        tit=sea_shore_date(sailor_com(n,2))-sailor_com(n,2); 
        %required rank of sailors billet 
        b_id=billet_id(billets,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        %if the sailor has a billet and the required rank is lower than 
his 
        %actual rank and he has more than 18 month of his tour he is in  
        %left, he should get a new billet. 
        if (b_id>0) 
            rr=billets(b_id,2); 
            if ((tit>=18 && 
sailor_com(n,3)>rr)||(sailor_com(n,3)>rr+1)) 
                
sailor_without_billet=add_sailor_to_swob(sailor_without_billet, 
assignments, sailor_com(n,1),time); 
            end, 
        end, 
        % calculation of a new promotion date (Monte Carlo simulation) 
        r=rand; 
        m=1; 
        while (m<l_prom_d+1) 
            if (r<promo_distrib_6_7(m,2)) 
                promo_date=promo_distrib_6_7(m,1); 
                m=l_prom_d+1; 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end, 
        end, 
        if (sailor_com(n,3)==5) 
            if (84>sailor_com(n,2)+36) 
 77
                sailor_com(n,7)=84+promo_date; 
            else 
                sailor_com(n,7)=sailor_com(n,2)+36+promo_date; 
            end, 
        end, 
        if (sailor_com(n,3)==6) 
            if (132>sailor_com(n,2)+36) 
                sailor_com(n,7)=132+promo_date; 
            else 
                sailor_com(n,7)=sailor_com(n,2)+36+promo_date; 
            end, 
        end, 











7. Future Assignments 
This procedure writes billets that will be free in the future to the file of 
empty billets, and also, writes available sailors to the file of sailors_without_billet 
if their new sea-shore rotation is coming up. Both events happened 9 month in 
advance. 
%billet and sailor search for future assignments 
[k,l]=size(sailor_com); 
for n=k:-1:1 
    %sailor who have to leave the system for sure with TIS=240  
    %will give there billet back 
    if (sailor_com(n,2)==231) 
        b_id=billet_id(billets,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        if (b_id>0) 
            
empty_billets=add_billet_to_eb(empty_billets,assignments,b_id, time+9); 
        end, 
    end, 
    %sailor who finish their tour in 9 month have to get a new billet 
    if (sea_shore_date(sailor_com(n,2))-sailor_com(n,2)==9) 
        if (sailor_com(n,2)==39 && sailor_com(n,8)==1) 
            
sailor_without_billet=add_sailor_to_swob_prio(sailor_without_billet, 
assignments, sailor_com(n,1), time+9); 
        else 
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sailor_without_billet=add_sailor_to_swob(sailor_without_billet, 
assignments, sailor_com(n,1), time+9); 
        end 
        %set change in needed billet type: 
        if (sailor_com(n,5)==1) 
            sailor_com(n,5)=0; 
        else 
            sailor_com(n,5)=1; 
        end, 






8. Find Assignments 
This procedure removes all E7s who are looking for a new billet from the 
system; the simulation is designed for E4 to E6 sailors and has no E7 billets. ..In 
a second step, the file with sailors looking for a billet is sorted. Sailors with 
priority come first, within the groups; sailors who needed the billet first, have first 
priority. Then, a decision about the matching procedure to use is made and the 
proper matching procedure is called. For each sailor, all available billets will be 
checked if they match with the given criteria. 
%this procedure looks for possible assignments 
nnm=1;%no_new_matches 
sailor_move; 
%removing E7 who are looking for a new billet out of the system 
[sn,l]=size(sailor_without_billet); 
for n=sn:-1:1 
    if (rank(sailor_com, sailor_without_billet(n,1))==7) 
        sailor_com=del_sailor_from_sc(sailor_com, 
sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
        dropout=[dropout ; sailor_without_billet(n,1)]; 
        b_id=billet_id(billets,sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
        if (b_id>0) 
            billets(b_id,6)=0; 
            empty_billets=add_billet_to_eb(empty_billets, assignments, 
b_id, time); 
        end, 
        sailor_without_billet(n,:)=[]; 
    end, 
end, 
while (nnm<2) 
    %match_criteria 
    mc=4; 
    while (mc>0) 
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        %sort sailor file first by priority bit and second by time 
        sailor_without_billet=sortrows(sailor_without_billet,[-3 2]); 
        [sn,l]=size(sailor_without_billet); 
        n=1; 
        %end whole procedure if no sailor is looking for a billet 
        if (sn==0) 
            nnm=2; 
        end, 
        [bn,p]=size(empty_billets); 
        while (n<sn+1) 
            m=1; 
            ss=sea_shore_ident(sailor_com, sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
            ra=rank(sailor_com, sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
            re=region(billets, sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
            while (m<bn+1) 
                %proof if a match procedure with or w/o NMI match 
criteria 
                %has to be used 
                if (nmi_t(sailor_com,sailor_without_billet(n,1))>0) 
                    if (mos(sailor_com,sailor_without_billet(n,1))>38 
&& nmi_i(sailor_com,sailor_without_billet(n,1))==1) 
                        match_w_nmi                     
                    else 
                        match_wo_nmi 
                    end, 
                else 
                    match_wo_nmi 
                end, 
                if (mc<2) 
                    m=bn+1; 
                end, 
            end, 
            n=n+1; 
        end, 
        %if no new match was found, the match criteria gets lowered 
        [cn,l]=size(sailor_without_billet); 
        if (cn==sn) 
            mc=mc-1; 
        end, 
    end, 


















9. Sailor Move 
If the time is right, this procedure moves the sailor from his old billet to the 




    % time check 
    if (time>=assignments(n,4)) 
        % check if the billet is free, so the sailor can move on 
        if (billets(assignments(n,3),6)==0) 
            billets(assignments(n,3),6)=assignments(n,1); 
            %set old billet of sailor free for another sailor 
            if (assignments(n,2)>0) 
                billets(assignments(n,2),6)=0; 
            end, 
            %save assignment to file 
            old_assignments=[old_assignments ; assignments(n,:)]; 
            %delete old executed assignment 
            assignments(n,:)=[]; 
        end 




This procedure includes three steps. First, all sailors with TIS of 240 leave 
the simulation and the billet becomes available. Second, all remaining sailors 
become one month older. Third, sailors who chose to take a NMI offer get 
checked. If the window of NMI use is over, the NMI indicator in the sailor file is 
reset. 
%aging sailor comunity by one month 
[k,l]=size(sailor_com); 
for n=k:-1:1 
    %sailors who reach TIS=240 have to leave and the billet gets set 
free 
    if (sailor_com(n,2)==240) 
        dropout=[dropout ; sailor_com(n,1)]; 
        b_id=billet_id(billets,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        billets(b_id,6)=0; 
        if (time<=10 && b_id>0) 
            empty_billets=add_billet_to_eb(empty_billets, assignments, 
b_id,time); 
        end, 
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sailor_without_billet=del_sailor_from_swob(sailor_without_billet,sailor
_com(n,1)); 
        
empty_billets=set_future_billet_free(empty_billets,assignments,sailor_c
om(n,1)); 
        assignments=del_sailor_from_assi(assignments,sailor_com(n,1)); 
        sailor_com(n,:)=[]; 
    %all other sailors get older 
    else 
        sailor_com(n,2)=sailor_com(n,2)+1; 
        sailor_com(n,4)=sailor_com(n,4)+1; 
        %reset the NMI indicator when time for NMI use is over 
        if (sailor_com(n,8)==1 && sailor_com(n,9)<4 && 
sailor_com(n,2)==84) 
            sailor_com(n,8)=0; 
        elseif (sailor_com(n,8)==1 && sailor_com(n,9)>3 && 
sailor_com(n,2)==120) 
            sailor_com(n,8)=0; 
        end, 







D. 1SUB PROCEDURES 
The idea behind these procedures is, that the code should be better 
readable and steps that have to be used more than once in the program can use 
the same code easily. 
1. Sailor Statistic 
This procedure is not relevant for the cost simulation process. The results 
have been used to validate to model. Average data collected by this procedure is 
shown in Figure 5.   
%sailor statistic 
%procedure counts sailors with same rank and years of service 




    count4=0; 
    count5=0; 
    count6=0; 
    count7=0; 
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    for z=1:i 
        if (sailor_com(z,2)<12*year && sailor_com(z,2)>12*(year-1)&& 
sailor_com(z,3)==4) 
                count4=count4+1; 
            end 
        if (sailor_com(z,2)<12*year && sailor_com(z,2)>12*(year-1)&& 
sailor_com(z,3)==5) 
                count5=count5+1; 
        end 
        if (sailor_com(z,2)<12*year && sailor_com(z,2)>12*(year-1)&& 
sailor_com(z,3)==6) 
                count6=count6+1; 
        end 
        if (sailor_com(z,2)<12*year && sailor_com(z,2)>12*(year-1)&& 
sailor_com(z,3)==7) 
                count7=count7+1; 
        end 
    end     
    statistic(1,year)=count4; 
    statistic(2,year)=count5; 
    statistic(3,year)=count6; 
    statistic(4,year)=count7; 
end 










2. Billet Control 
This procedure proofs if all billets, that are empty, are still in use at the end 
of the month. If these billets are not in account, they will be written to the empty 
billet file. 
% procedure put empty billets back into file with empty billets 
for i=1:553 
    if (billets(i,6)==0) 
        empty_billets=add_billet_to_eb(empty_billets, assignments, i, 
time); 




3. Sum Mismatch Cost 
At the end of each simulation month, this procedure sums the mismatch 
related costs. 
%routins sums up the billets mismatch cost, cost that are arise because 
%there is not the right sailor available for a billet 
rank_cost=[0 0 0 1986 2305 2801 3505]; 
c=0; 
for i=1:553 
    if (billets(i,6)>0) 
        r=rank(sailor_com,billets(i,6)); 
        if (billets(i,2)==r) 
            c=0; 
        else 
            c=abs(rank_cost(billets(i,2))-rank_cost(r)); 
        end, 
    else 
        c=rank_cost(billets(i,2)); 
    end 





           
4. Match without NMI 
This procedure follows the match criteria in table XZ. No match with the 
given criteria switches the criteria to the use of the 1st alternative criteria and later 
to the 2nd alternative of criteria. 
%matching without nmi 
if (mc==4) 
    %sea-shore-check and time check 
    if (ss==billets(empty_billets(m,1),3) && 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2))) 
        %rank check 
        if (ra==billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)) 
            %region check 
            if (re==billets(empty_billets(m,1),4)) 
                write_match 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end 
    else 
        m=m+1; 




    %sea-shore-check and time check 
    if (ss==billets(empty_billets(m,1),3) && 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2))) 
        %rank check 
        if (ra==billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)) 
            write_match 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end 
    else 
        m=m+1; 
    end, 
end, 
if (mc==2) 
    %sea-shore-check and time check 
    if (ss==billets(empty_billets(m,1),3) && 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2))) 
        %rank check (rank=rank+1) 
        br=billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)-1; 
        if (ra==br) 
            write_match 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end 
    else 
        m=m+1; 
    end,                     
end, 
if (mc<2) 
    m=bn+1; 
end, 
 
5. Match with NMI 
Depending on the NMI type the sailor has chosen or is tested, this 
procedure proofs if a billet fits a sailor. The match criteria are shown in table XZ.  
%matching with nmi 
typ=nmi_t(sailor_com,sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
%nmi typ 1 (region must match with wish of sailor) 
if (typ==1 || typ==5) 
    if (mc==4) 
        %sea-shore-check and time check 
        if (ss==billets(empty_billets(m,1),3) && 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2))) 
            %rank check 
            if (ra==billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)) 
                %region check 
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                if (nmi_r(sailor_com, 
sailor_without_billet(n,1))==billets(empty_billets(m,1),4)) 
                    write_match_nmi 
                else 
                    m=m+1; 
                end 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end, 
    end, 
    if (mc==3) 
        %sea-shore-check and time check 
        if (ss==billets(empty_billets(m,1),3) && 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2))) 
            %rank check (rank=rank+1) 
            br=billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)-1; 
            if (ra==br) 
                %region check 
                if (nmi_r(sailor_com, 
sailor_without_billet(n,1))==billets(empty_billets(m,1),4)) 
                    write_match_nmi 
                else 
                    m=m+1; 
                end 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end,         
    end, 
    if (mc<3) 
        m=bn+1; 
    end, 
end, 
%nmi typ 2 (platform must match with wish of sailor) 
if (typ==2) 
    if (mc==4) 
        %time check 
        if 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2)) 
        %rank check 
            if (ra==billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)) 
                %platform check 
                if (nmi_p(sailor_com, 
sailor_without_billet(n,1))==billets(empty_billets(m,1),5)) 
                    write_match_nmi 
                else 
                    m=m+1; 
                end 
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            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
             m=m+1; 
        end, 
    end, 
    if (mc==3) 
    %time check 
    if 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2)) 
        %rank check (rank=rank+1) 
        br=billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)-1; 
        if (ra==br) 
            %platform check 
            if (nmi_p(sailor_com, 
sailor_without_billet(n,1))==billets(empty_billets(m,1),5)) 
                write_match_nmi 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end 
    else 
         m=m+1; 
    end,         
    end, 
    if (mc<3) 
        m=bn+1; 
    end, 
end, 
%nmi typ 3 (region andplatform must match with wish of sailor) 
if (typ==3 || typ==6) 
    if (mc==4) 
        %time check 
        if 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2)) 
            %rank check 
            if (ra==billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)) 
                %platform and region check   




                    write_match_nmi 
                else 
                    m=m+1; 
                end 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
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             m=m+1; 
        end, 
    end, 
    if (mc==3) 
    %time check 
    if 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2)) 
        %rank check (rank=rank+1) 
        br=billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)-1; 
        if (ra==br) 
            %platform and region check 




                write_match_nmi 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end 
    else 
         m=m+1; 
    end,         
    end, 
    if (mc<3) 
        m=bn+1; 
    end, 
end, 
% nmi typ 4, regional stability for two tours 
if (typ==4) 
    if (mc==4) 
        %sea-shore-check and time check 
        if (ss==billets(empty_billets(m,1),3) && 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2))) 
            %rank check 
            if (ra==billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)) 
                %region check 
                b_id=billet_id(billets, sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
                if (b_id>0) 
                    re=billets(b_id,4); 
                else 
                    re=1; 
                end, 
                if (re==billets(empty_billets(m,1),4)) 
                    write_match_nmi 
                else 
                    m=m+1; 
                end 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
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    else 
         m=m+1; 
    end, 
    end, 
    if (mc==3) 
    %sea-shore-check and time check 
    if (ss==billets(empty_billets(m,1),3) && 
(sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=empty_billets(m,2)||time>=empty_billets(m,
2))) 
        %rank check (rank=rank+1) 
        br=billets(empty_billets(m,1),2)-1; 
        if (ra==br) 
            %region check 
            b_id=billet_id(billets, sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
            if (b_id>0) 
                re=billets(b_id,4); 
            else 
                re=1; 
            end, 
            if (re==billets(empty_billets(m,1),4)) 
                write_match_nmi 
            else 
                m=m+1; 
            end 
        else 
            m=m+1; 
        end 
    else 
         m=m+1; 
    end,         
    end, 
    if (mc<3) 
        m=bn+1; 




6. Write Match 
This procedure adds the found match to the assignment file. In a second 
step the sailor’s old billet is added to the file of empty billets. 
%procedure writes found match in the list of assignments 
%calculating the point of the assignment 
if (sailor_without_billet(n,2)>=time) 
    t=sailor_without_billet(n,2); 
else 
    t=time; 
end, 
new_assi=[sailor_without_billet(n,1) billet_id(billets, 
sailor_without_billet(n,1)) empty_billets(m,1) t t-




%add sailors old billet to 'empty_billets' 
b_id=billet_id(billets,sailor_without_billet(n,1)); 
if (b_id>0) 











7. Cost Statistic 
This procedure writes all information collected from one experiment into a 
result file. To do so, the procedure does the necessary calculation first. 
%procedure calculates costs and other statistics based on information 
in  
%the variable old-assignments 
[r,p]=size(old_assignments); 
%multiplier for sailors alowed pcs costs 
multi=[0 0 0 14 14 15]; 
%calculation of the mismatch cost per month and billet 
mismatch_cost_billet=mismatch_cost/(553*(month-start)); 
%deleting of older assignments that where executed before point of 
interest 
for i=r:-1:1 
    if (start>old_assignments(i,4)) 
        old_assignments(i,:)=[]; 
    end, 
end, 
[r,p]=size(old_assignments); 






%cost calculation for all assignments 
for i=1:r 
    %looking for the region the sailor started his movement 
    if (old_assignments(i,2)==0) 
        reg_old_billet=1; 
    else 
        reg_old_billet=billets(old_assignments(i,2),4); 
    end, 




    tot_wait=tot_wait+old_assignments(i,5); 
    %counting the number of assignment found by using NMI match 
criteria 
    %and counting the number of offered NMI 
    if (old_assignments(i,7)==1) 
        c=0; 
        for j=1:i-1 
            if (old_assignments(j,1)==old_assignments(i,1) && 
old_assignments(j,7)==1) 
                c=1; 
                j=i-1; 
            end 
        end 
        if (c==0) 
            number_nmi=number_nmi+1; 
        end, 
        number_nmi_assi=number_nmi_assi+1; 
        tot_wait_nmi=tot_wait_nmi+old_assignments(i,5); 
    end, 
end, 




%documentation of experiments results 
result=[result; ave_cost r ave_wait number_nmi number_nmi_assi 
ave_wait_nmi mismatch_cost_billet month start percent nmi_typ];  
 
8. Variable Load 
At the beginning of each experiment, the variables needed are loaded 
from the hard drive. The variables are saved in different files to facilitate changes 
in the simulation set up.  
%load variables for simulation 
load sailor_com.mat 
load billets.mat 




%Promotion distribution to E5 
load promotion5.mat 
%Promotion distribution to E6/E7 
load promotion6_7.mat 





1. Add Billet to Empty Billet 
This function adds a billet to the matrix of empty billets. Before it does so, 
it checks if the billet is already in the file. If the billet is already in, the procedure 
only might change the time the billet is free.  
%function that adds a billet to empty billets or change the time the 
billet 
%will be free 





%check if billet is already in the file 
while (m<r+1) 
    if (billet_id==eb(m,1)) 
        if (eb(m,2)>t) 
            eb(m,2)=t; 
        end 
        c=1; 
        m=r+1; 
    else 
        m=m+1; 
    end, 
end, 
%check if the billet is given to another sailor but sailor has not 
moved to 
%the billet yet. 
for i=1:q 
    if (billet_id==assi(i,3)) 
        c=1; 
    end, 
end, 
if (c==0) 
    eb=[eb; billet_id t]; 
end, 
 
2. Add Sailor to Sailor without Billet File 
Only one of these similar functions is described here. These functions add 
a sailor to the file “sailor_without_billet” if the sailor is not in included. 
%function that adds a sailor to sailor_without_billet or change the 
time the billet 
%is needed 






% check if sailor is already in the file 
while (m<r+1) 
    if (sailor_id==swob(m,1)) 
        if (t<swob(m,2)) 
            swob(m,2)=t; 
        end 
        c=1; 
        m=r+1; 
    else 
        m=m+1; 
    end, 
end, 
% check if sailor is already assigned 
for i=1:q 
    if (sailor_id==assi(i,1)) 
        c=1; 
    end, 
end, 
if (c==0) 
    swob=[swob; sailor_id t 0]; 
end, 
 
3. Billet Identification Number 
This small function records the billet ID of a billet the sailor uses at the 
time. 





    if (sailor_id==billets(m,6)) 
        bill_id=billets(m,1); 
        m=554; 
    else 
        m=m+1; 
    end, 
end, 
 
4. Deleting a Sailor from the Files 
Complete sailor information is saved in the sailor community file. If a sailor 
has to leave the experiment, this information has to be deleted. Because of the 
possibility that the sailor can look for a new billet at the time he has to leave, his 
ID has to be deleted from the “sailor_without_billet” file as well. The same applies 
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to the assignment file. If a sailor is not completely deleted, he might use a billet 
forever and new sailors could not get this billet. The simulation program uses an 
own function to delete a sailor from each file. These functions are similar, only 
one (deleting a sailor from the “sailor_without_billet” file) is shown below: 





    if (sailor_id==swob(m,1)) 
        swob(m,:)=[]; 
        m=r+1; 
    else 
        m=m+1; 
    end, 
end, 
 
5. Functions Looking for Sailor Information 
The sailor identification number is not related to a position in the sailor 
community file. The sailor community file changes its size every month through 
attrition, growth and aging. It also changes the position of sailors within the file. 
Therefore, a tool is necessary to get sailor information out of the file for a given 
sailor identification number. The simulation uses an own function for all 
information. The information a function can look for are: TIS (Mos), Rank (Rank), 
NMI indicator(Nmi_i), Platform wish (Nmi_p), Homeport wish (Nmi_r) ,NMI type 
wish (Nmi_t) and Sea-Shore indicator (Sea_shore_ident). All these functions use 
a similar routine. The procedure for the rank is shown here: 






    if (sailor_id==sailors(m,1)) 
        r=sailors(m,3); 
        m=554; 
    else 
        m=m+1; 




6. Sea-shore Date 
This function calculates the next date for a sea-shore rotation in month of 
service (TIS). 





    if (mos<rot_date(m)) 
        date=rot_date(m); 
        m=7; 
    else 
        m=m+1; 
    end, 
end 
    
7. Set Billet Free 
If a sailor has to leave the system and is assigned to a new billet, but has 
not yet moved, this function writes the billet back to the file of empty billets. 
%functions that put a billet that should be used in the future by a 
leaving 
%sailor back to empty_billets 




    if (sailor_id==assi(m,1)) 
        eb=add_billet_to_eb(eb, assi, assi(m,3),assi(m,4)); 
        m=r+1; 
    else 
        m=m+1; 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Bureau of Navy Personnel, B. (2009, September). Aviation Support Equipment 
Technician. Retrieved October 25, 2009, from AS Community Overview: 
http://www.npc.navy.mil/Enlisted/CommunityManagers/Aviation/AS.htm 
Department of the Navy, D. (2000, February). Fiscal Year 2001, Budgets 
Estimates. Retrieved March 05, 2010, from Military Personnel, Navy: 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/01pres/PERS/MPN_Book.pdf 
Department of the Navy, D. (2010, February). Fiscal year 2011, Budgets 
Estimates. Retrieved March 05, 2010, from Military Personnel, Navy: 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/11pres/MPN_Book.pdf 
Exams_tutor_business. (n.d.). Study Room. Retrieved March 12, 2010, from 
Motivation - 4. Herzbergs Two Factor Theory: 
http://www.examstutor.com/business/resources/studyroom/people_and_or
ganisations/motivation_theory/4-herzbergstwofactortheory.php 
GAO. (2002, November 25). Military Personnel: Management and Oversight of 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs Improvement. Retrieved 
February 15, 2010, from GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.item/d03149.pdf 
Keller, G. (2005). Statistics for Management and Economics, Ed. 7. Belmont: 
Thompson South-Western. 
Kohn, A. (1993). Ultimate Rewards. A Harvard Business Review Book. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Military.com. (2009, October). Military Professional Development Center. 
Retrieved October 15, 2009, from Navy Enlisted Advancement System: 
http://www.military.com/MilitaryCareers/Content/0,14556,Promotion_Navy
_E5,00.html 
Morben, D. M. (September 1989). A Simulation Study of an Optimazation Model 
for Surface Nuclear Accession Planning. Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
Navy.mil. (2002, 7 10). Navy announces High Year Tenure Policy Revision. 
Retrieved November 9, 2009, from 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=2472 
Nelson, B. (1999, February 1). Inc. Retrieved March 15, 2010, from Incentives for 
All Generations: http://www.inc.com/articles/1999/02/16431.html# 
 96
Schlegel, R. J. (2000). An Activity Based Costing Analysis of the Department of 
the Navy's Enlisted Detailing Process. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate 
School. 
Stitt, R. D. (December 2009). Identifying the Cost of Non-monetary Incentives 
(ICONIC). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Zimmermann, B. (December 2008). Integrating Monetary and Non-Monentary 
Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Dr. William R. Gates 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Dr. Rachel T. Johnson 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Andreas Buelow 
Rostock, Germany 
